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INTRODUCTION 
Sexual harassment in the workplace frequently occurs between 
supervisors and employees.1  Enabled by the authority and power of their 
positions, supervisors are capable of harming employees in ways 
unavailable to mere co-workers.2  Consequently, under Title VII, an 
employer may be held vicariously liable when a supervisor sexually 
harasses another employee.3  However, determining the exact parameters of 
an employer’s liability is a contentious area of sexual harassment law.4  
Recent Supreme Court cases have established a framework for employer 
liability under which an employer is vicariously liable when a supervisor’s 
conduct culminates in a tangible employment action.5  In the absence of a 
tangible employment action, however, the employer can raise an 
affirmative defense to liability, which, if met, effectively terminates the 
lawsuit.6 
The term tangible employment action is defined as a significant change 
in employment status and most commonly describes acts such as “hiring, 
                                                          
 1. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 798 (1998) (asserting that sexual 
harassment by supervisors is a “persistent problem” in the workplace and justifies legal 
developments that shift the burden of the “untoward” conduct to the employer as a cost of 
business); see also Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance:  The Final Triumph of 
Form Over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 5-8 (2003) 
(commenting that four out of ten women are victims of sexual harassment). 
 2. See Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 854 (1991) (emphasizing 
that a supervisor’s unique position of authority in the workplace enables the supervisor to 
sexually harass other employees). 
 3. See David B. Oppenheimer, Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment by 
Supervisors, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 272, 272 (Catherine A. 
MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004) (discussing employer liability standards for 
workplace sexual harassment). 
 4. Compare B. Glenn George, Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment:  The Buck 
Stops Where?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 14-16 (1999) (postulating that Ellerth most 
likely narrowed the category of conduct for which an employer could be held automatically 
liable), with Angela Scott, Casenote, Employers Beware!  The United States Supreme Court 
Opens the Floodgates on Employer Liability Under Title VII.  Burlington Industries, Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 118 S.Ct. 2257 (1998), 24 S. ILL. U. L. J. 157, 172-74 (1999) (arguing that 
employers’ vicarious liability for sexual harassment is limited only by a poorly defined 
affirmative defense). 
 5. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804 (establishing a liability framework which confers 
liability based on the presence of an agency relationship between the employer and the 
harassing supervisor). 
 6. See discussion infra Part I.C. (pointing out that few obstacles prevent an employer 
from successfully raising an affirmative defense). 
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firing, or failing to promote,” through which the supervisor exercises 
company authority to inflict harm on another employee.7  This term, which 
is the link that renders the employer automatically liable for the 
supervisor’s conduct, is pivotal in sexual harassment law.8  Many courts 
hold that the term tangible employment action is limited exclusively to a 
narrow category of conduct that constitutes direct economic loss.9  In the 
context of sexual harassment, however, where the mistreatment an 
employee experiences may not be “tangible” in the traditional sense, the 
scope of this definition is less clear.10  Many commentators suggest that an 
inordinately high number of Title VII violations are dismissed at summary 
judgment.11  A narrow definition of the term tangible employment action 
would increase this number.12  Accordingly, identifying the parameters of 
this term is crucial for victims of sexual harassment.13  To encourage lower 
                                                          
 7. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998) (defining a tangible 
employment action as “a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, 
failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision 
causing a significant change in benefits”). 
 8. See Philip K. Lyon & Bruce H. Phillips, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton and 
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth:  Sexual Harassment Under Title VII Reaches Adolescence, 
29 U. MEM. L. REV. 601, 633-34 (1999) (concluding that the presence of a tangible 
employment action is “the guidepost” for employer liability in sexual harassment cases). 
 9. See, e.g., Barra v. Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist., 858 A.2d 206, 217 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2004) (finding no tangible employment action despite the presence of conduct that could be 
considered substantial changes in employment status). 
 10. See Martha Chamallas, Title VII’s Midlife Crisis:  The Case of Constructive 
Discharge, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 307, 311 (2004) (stressing that while the scope of the tangible 
employment action framework is a “seemingly small doctrinal issue,” it often determines 
the outcome of many cases because, in the absence of a tangible employment action, 
employers are commonly able to successfully raise the affirmative defense).  A narrow 
definition of the term tangible employment action will permit many employers to raise an 
affirmative defense to vicarious liability.  Id.  This will inevitably lead to an increase in the 
number of cases dismissed at summary judgment.  Id.  Chamallas’ excellent work on 
constructive discharge proposes a causation-based model under which a constructive 
discharge would always constitute a tangible employment action.  Id. at 391.  Chamallas 
makes a powerful argument that supervisors utilize informal workplace structures to 
sexually harass subordinate employees as effectively as they utilize official power.  Id. 
 11. See John H. Marks, Smoke, Mirrors, and the Disappearance of “Vicarious” 
Liability:  The Emergence of a Dubious Summary-Judgment Safe Harbor for Employers 
Whose Supervisory Personnel Commit Hostile Environment Workplace Harassment, 38 
HOUS. L. REV. 1401, 1405 (2002) (noting that the low threshold required for employers to 
satisfy the Ellerth and Faragher affirmative defense allows employers to easily meet the 
requirements for summary dismissal of many sexual harassment cases). 
 12. See Chamallas, supra note 10, at 325-26 (emphasizing that the absence of a tangible 
employment action increases the likelihood that the victim’s claim will be dismissed and 
injuries from the sexual harassment will remain uncompensated). 
 13. See Lyon & Phillips, supra note 8, at 633-34 (asserting that because the presence of 
a tangible employment action is now the “guidepost” for sexual harassment claims, 
plaintiffs should develop whatever facts possible to demonstrate the presence of a tangible 
employment action); David F. McCann, Issues in the Third Circuit:  Supervisory Sexual 
Harassment and Employer Liability:  The Third Circuit Sheds Light on Vicarious Liability 
and Affirmative Defenses, 45 VILL. L. REV. 767, 783-84 (2000) (highlighting that the 
presence or absence of a tangible employment action “is of paramount importance” for 
victims of sexual harassment). 
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courts to establish a broad definition of the term tangible employment 
action, this Comment advocates a construction of this term to include two 
forms of supervisory conduct:  (1) conduct that constitutes direct economic 
loss, and (2) conduct that leads to consequential economic loss.14 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Pennsylvania State Police v. 
Suders,15 which raised important questions about the scope of employer 
liability, permits a broad definition of the term tangible employment 
action.16  In holding that a constructive discharge is not a per se tangible 
employment action, the Court stated that cases involving supervisory-based 
sexual harassment should be divided based on the presence or absence of 
an official action.17  In Suders, Ms. Suders’ supervisors hid her computer 
skills exams, did not score the exams, told her that she failed the exams, 
and accused her of theft when she discovered the exams hidden in a file 
cabinet.18  The Court stated that “[a]lthough most of the discriminatory 
behavior Ms. Suders alleged involved unofficial conduct, the events 
surrounding her computer-skills exams . . . were less obviously 
unofficial.”19  This observation suggests that the Court’s definition of the 
term tangible employment action is not limited to a narrow category of 
supervisory conduct, but rather covers a broad range of such conduct.20 
                                                          
 14. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 110, at 
766-67 (5th ed. 1984) (asserting that two forms of damages, direct and consequential, are 
available in tort actions involving misrepresentation and nondisclosure).  The authors 
discuss the extent that the doctrines of misrepresentation and non-disclosure run throughout 
tort law.  Id. § 105, at 725.  Although the two categories of damages are discussed in 
relation to the tort of misrepresentation and nondisclosure, the principle can be transferred to 
a federally recognized tort such as sexual harassment where a supervisor uses a position of 
authority to inflict emotional distress on another employee.  Cf. id. (recognizing that a 
fraudulent lie may give rise to a cause of action for the intentional infliction of mental 
suffering). 
 15. 542 U.S. 129 (2004).   
 16. See Joan M. Gilbride & Yael J. Erdheim, ‘Suders’ is a Small Victory for Plaintiffs, 
N.Y. L. J., July 22, 2004, at 4 (noting that determining what conduct constitutes a tangible 
employment action under Suders is a question lower courts are left to resolve). 
 17. See Suders, 542 U.S. at 140-41 (concluding that hostile work environment 
constructive discharge qualifies as a tangible employment action only when precipitated by 
an official act); Gilbride & Erdheim, supra note 16, at 4 (appraising the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Suders and predicting that the Supreme Court’s failure to provide precise 
guidelines for the term “official” action will leave the question for lower courts to decide). 
 18. Suders, 542 U.S. at 136. 
 19. Id. at 152 n.11; cf. Shari M. Goldsmith, Casenote:  The Supreme Court’s Suders 
Problem:  Wrong Question, Wrong Facts Determining Whether a Constructive Discharge is 
a Tangible Employment Action, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 817, 844-45 (2004) (criticizing 
the Third Circuit’s decision in Ms. Suders’ case for avoiding the complicated issue of 
whether an official act lay at the root of the supervisors’ discriminatory conduct). 
 20. See Suders, 542 U.S. at 152 n.11 (suggesting that a factfinder could find that the 
supervisors’ actions regarding the computer skills exams constituted official conduct); see, 
e.g., Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 153 (3d Cir. 1999) (positing that 
although direct economic harm is frequently present in a tangible employment action, it is 
not required and that if a supervisor’s conduct decreases earning potential or causes a 
significant disruption in working conditions, a tangible employment action may be found). 
ELSENHEIMER OFFTOPRINTER 2/24/2006  2:45:15 PM 
2005] AGENCY AND LIABILITY IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 1639 
To facilitate this argument, Part I provides a background of sexual 
harassment law under Title VII.21  Part I examines the Supreme Court’s 
recognition of hostile work environment sexual harassment as a form of 
gender discrimination under Title VII.22  It discusses the Court’s recent 
application of the term tangible employment action and addresses the 
Court’s ambiguous definition of this term.23  Part II of this Comment 
advocates a broad interpretation of the term tangible employment action24 
and argues that this interpretation is consistent with both the “aided by the 
agency” standard for employer liability25 and the Court’s decision in 
Suders.26  Finally, Part II argues that a broad definition of the term tangible 
employment action facilitates Title VII’s objective of deterrence and 
remediation.27 
I. TANGIBLE EMPLOYMENT ACTIONS EMERGE AS THE “GUIDEPOST” FOR 
EMPLOYER LIABILITY 
In an attempt to deter sexual harassment and provide a remedy for 
victims of sexual harassment, Title VII28 holds employers vicariously liable 
when a supervisor sexually harasses another employee.29  The scope of an 
employer’s liability, however, is an enduring problem in sexual harassment 
law.30  After several years of confusion among the lower courts, the 
Supreme Court finally established a uniform framework for employer 
                                                          
 21. See discussion infra Parts I.A., I.B. (detailing the development of employer liability 
standards for supervisory-based sexual harassment). 
 22. See discussion infra Part I.A. (examining the doctrinal development of employer 
liability for sexual harassment perpetrated by a supervisory employee). 
 23. See discussion infra Part I.C. (appraising the problems associated with the 
affirmative defense framework established in Ellerth and Faragher). 
 24. See discussion infra Part II.A. (expounding a definition of the term tangible 
employment action that includes both direct and consequential economic loss). 
 25. See discussion infra Part II.B. (applying the “aided by the agency” standard to the 
definition of tangible employment actions advocated in this comment). 
 26. See discussion infra Part II.C. (contending that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Suders supports a broad definition of the term tangible employment action). 
 27. See discussion infra Part II.D. (ensuring that a broad definition of the term tangible 
employment action is consistent with Title VII’s deterrent objective). 
 28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000) (stating “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin . . . .”); see Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1986) (explaining 
Congress’ last-minute decision to include a prohibition against sexual discrimination as part 
of Title VII). 
 29. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70 (concluding that Title VII limits the extent to which an 
employer can be held liable when a supervisor sexually harasses an employee). 
 30. See B. Glenn George, If You’re Not Part of the Solution, You’re Part of the 
Problem:  Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 133, 136-
38, 142-43 (2001) (suggesting that the lower courts’ struggle to interpret vague and unclear 
liability standards characterizes the history of employer liability for sexual harassment). 
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liability.31  The presence or absence of a tangible employment action is 
central to this liability framework and remains the “guidepost”32 for 
employer liability in sexual harassment law.33  A tangible employment 
action, which occurs when a supervisor exercises official company 
authority to sexually harass the employee, signifies the category of conduct 
that connects the supervisor to the employer and renders the employer 
liable for the sexual harassment.34  Although this framework has been 
criticized,35 it continues to guide courts in determining the proper 
circumstances under which an employer can be held liable for a 
supervisor’s sexual harassment of another employee.36 
 A.  Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment 
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,37 the Supreme Court recognized 
                                                          
 31. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (establishing a bright 
line framework for employer liability when a supervisor sexually harasses an employee); 
Lyon & Phillips, supra note 8, at 617 (suggesting that the Supreme Court’s adoption of a 
bright line liability test in Ellerth and Faragher eliminated the cumbersome need under 
Meritor to determine whether a plaintiff’s claim met the definition of quid pro quo sexual 
harassment). 
 32. See Lyon & Phillips, supra note 8, at 634 (“The presence of a tangible employment 
action is now the guidepost for liability in all cases involving sexual harassment by 
supervisors.”). 
 33. See George, supra note 30, at 141 (emphasizing that where no tangible employment 
action is alleged the analysis of liability moves from a focus on the employer’s vicarious 
liability to an analysis of the employer’s negligence under the affirmative defense 
framework). 
 34. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 760 (1998) (establishing 
employer liability standards for hostile work environment sexual harassment).  Many courts 
have confused the term “tangible employment action,” used for determining an employer’s 
liability for supervisory-based sexual harassment, with the term “adverse employment 
action,” used for determining whether a plaintiff has an actionable claim of gender 
discrimination or retaliation under Title VII.  See, e.g., Hillig v. Rumsfeld, 381 F.3d 1028, 
1031 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting that the Ellerth and Faragher definition of tangible 
employment actions was not meant to provide a comprehensive definition of adverse 
employment actions for all employment discrimination claims); Rosalie Berger Levinson, 
Parsing the Meaning of “Adverse Employment Action” in Title VII Disparate Treatment, 
Sexual Harassment, and Retaliation Claims:  What Should Be Actionable Wrongdoing?, 56 
OKLA. L. REV. 623, 634-36 (2003) (contending that due to different policy concerns, the 
standard for defining a tangible employment action for purposes of liability differs 
significantly from the standard for defining an adverse employment action for purposes of 
establishing a prima facie case under Title VII).  But see, e.g., Knight v. Norton, No. 02-
8628, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9472, at *13 (E.D. Pa. May 19, 2004) (applying the definition 
of the term tangible employment action established in Ellerth to an analysis of whether a 
plaintiff has met the prima facie requirement of showing an adverse employment action). 
 35. See Brian C. Baldrate, Note, Agency Law and the Supreme Court’s Compromise on 
“Hostile Environment” Sexual Harassment in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and 
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1149, 1176-77 (1999) (contending that 
the Court’s holdings in Ellerth and Faragher ultimately make the lower courts’ task of 
assigning liability for supervisory based sexual harassment more difficult). 
 36. See Lyon & Phillips, supra note 8, at 626 (indicating that employer liability in light 
of Ellerth and Faragher hinges on whether or not the sexual harassment involved a tangible 
employment action). 
 37. See 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (holding that hostile environment sexual harassment is 
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hostile work environment sexual harassment as a cause of action under 
Title VII and concluded that Title VII prohibits gender discrimination even 
if the discrimination results in purely psychological or emotional injuries.38  
Prior to Meritor, Title VII’s prohibition was limited to conduct described as 
quid pro quo sexual harassment,39 which exists when an employer 
conditions a promotion, employment status, or higher wages on the 
employee’s submission to the supervisor’s sexual advances.40  A hostile 
work environment claim, in contrast, is not limited to employment status or 
promotion,41 but rather involves “intimidating, hostile, or offensive”42 
conditions of employment.43  Meritor thus provided a framework for two 
forms of sexual harassment:  (1) hostile work environment, and (2) quid 
pro quo.44  In recent decisions, however, the Supreme Court has effectively 
                                                          
actionable under Title VII); see also Oppenheimer, supra note 3, at 278 (applauding the 
Supreme Court in Meritor for adopting the view that sexual harassment is a recognized form 
of sexual discrimination). 
 38. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64 (expanding Title VII’s scope beyond merely economic 
injuries to include psychological and emotional injuries); see also Bundy v. Jackson, 641 
F.2d 934, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (reasoning that Title VII’s specific prohibition of 
discriminatory conduct affecting an employee’s “conditions of employment” was not 
limited merely to economic job benefits but rather included psychological and emotional 
injuries arising out of a sexually hostile work environment). 
 39. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 901 (11th Cir. 1982) (noting that Title 
VII is not limited to conduct which results in tangible job consequences); Bundy, 641 F.2d 
at 945-46 (finding a Title VII violation when a supervisor sexually harasses an employee, 
regardless of economic injury, so long as the discrimination significantly alters the 
conditions of employment). 
 40. See Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 1994) (summarizing that quid pro 
quo sexual harassment occurs when a supervisor conditions a job benefit or detriment upon 
an employee’s acceptance of the supervisor’s sexual advances); Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., 
Inc., 912 F. Supp. 1101, 1115 n.10 (N.D. Ill. 1996), rev’d en banc per curiam sub nom. 
Jansen v. Packaging Corp., 123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997), aff’d sub nom. Burlington Indus., 
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) (commenting that to prevail on a claim for quid pro quo 
sexual harassment the plaintiff would have to prove that the supervisor actually withheld 
benefits from the plaintiff as a result of the plaintiff’s failure to submit to the supervisor’s 
sexual demands). 
 41. See Bundy, 641 F.2d at 944 (interpreting the clause “conditions of employment” 
under Title VII to include psychological and emotional injuries); see, e.g., Alfano v. 
Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 373 (2d Cir. 2002) (discussing the elements required for a hostile 
work environment claim). 
 42. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66 (recognizing a cause of action for hostile work 
environment sexual harassment, which unlike a quid pro quo claim, is unrelated to the 
economic nature of the victim’s injuries). 
 43. See Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that 
pervasive insults to women in general, and to female employees in particular, may be used 
as evidence of a hostile work environment); Ross v. Double Diamond, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 
261, 271-73 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (stating that Title VII is not a shield to protect employees 
from discrimination, but rather provides remedies for those whose claim is sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to alter employment conditions or create a hostile work environment). 
 44. See Baldrate, supra note 35, at 1154-55 (emphasizing Meritor’s accomplishments in 
the field of sexual harassment law).  Meritor had three significant accomplishments.  Id.  
First, it was the first time the Supreme Court recognized hostile work environment sexual 
harassment.  Id.  Second, the Court refused to hold employers automatically liable for 
supervisory-based sexual harassment.  Id.  Third, the Court indicated that employer liability 
under Title VII should be governed by agency principles.  Id. 
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abolished this distinction and reworked the framework of employer liability 
to focus on the presence or absence of a tangible employment action.45 
1.  Meritor’s liability framework failed to accommodate many claims of 
sexual harassment 
After Meritor, the development of ambiguous liability standards among 
the lower courts revealed the problem with the Court’s distinction between 
quid pro quo and hostile work environment sexual harassment.46  Guided 
by Meritor’s instruction to limit employer liability, lower courts turned to 
the common law agency principles summarized in the Restatement 
(Second) of Agency to establish standards for employer liability.47  
Frequently, lower courts applied the “scope of employment” standard, 
under which an employer is vicariously liable only if the supervisor’s 
actions are within the scope of the supervisor’s employment.48  Courts, 
                                                          
 45. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 801 (1998) (suggesting that the 
move toward a standard of liability that hinges on the presence of a tangible employment 
action is designed to ensure uniform liability standards among the various forms of sexual 
harassment claims). 
 46. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72 (declining the opportunity to declare a definitive rule on 
employer liability).  In Meritor, rather than adopting a definitive rule of employer liability, 
the Supreme Court stated two general, and ultimately confusing, guidelines.  Id..  First, the 
Court in Meritor stated that employers are not automatically liable for supervisory-based 
sexual harassment.  Id.  Second, the Court stated that the lack of notice to the employer does 
not necessarily shield the employer from liability.  Id.; see Faragher, 524 U.S. at 785 
(assessing the problems with establishing appropriate standards for employer liability for 
supervisory-based sexual harassment).  After Meritor, the lower courts struggled to establish 
appropriate and uniform standards of employer liability.  Faragher, 524 U.S. at 785; see 
Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 464-65 (7th Cir. 1990) (asserting a 
negligence standard for employer liability under which an employer is liable only if the 
employer knew of the discriminatory conduct and did nothing to stop it); cf. RICHARD A. 
EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS:  THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 
360-63 (1992) (contending that the Supreme Court’s decision in Meritor is inadequate 
because it conflates the common law doctrine of respondeat superior with employer liability 
under Title VII).  Compare Ross, 672 F. Supp. at 274 (adopting the concurrence opinion in 
Meritor as a basis for imposing strict liability on an employer for a supervisor’s 
discriminatory conduct), with Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 n.1 
(11th Cir. 1989) (observing that when a supervisor acts outside the scope of employment, 
the employer can be indirectly liable for the sexual harassment if the employer knew or 
should have known about the discrimination and did nothing to stop it). 
 47. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 755 (1998) (noting that the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency is a useful foundation for establishing standards of 
employer liability under Title VII).  Under Section 219 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Agency: 
(1) A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while 
acting outside the scope of their employment.  (2) A master is not subject to 
liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the scope of their employment, 
unless:  (a) the master intended the conduct or consequences; or (b) the master was 
negligent or reckless; or (c) the conduct violated a non-delagable duty of the 
master; or (4) (i) the servant purported to act or speak on behalf of the principle and 
there was reliance upon apparent authority, or (ii) he was aided in accomplishing 
the tort by the existence of the agency relation. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958). 
 48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1); see Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 756 
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however, rarely found sexual harassment, which is frequently framed as a 
“frolic and detour,”49 to be within a supervisor’s “scope of employment.”50  
When the sexual harassment fell outside the scope of employment, as it 
usually does, courts applied the negligence standard,51 under which an 
employer is liable only when the employer negligently fails to stop the 
sexual harassment.52  These liability standards, which often posed an 
insurmountable barrier to plaintiffs’ efforts to establish employer liability 
for hostile work environment sexual harassment,53 forced many plaintiffs to 
frame their sexual harassment suits as quid pro quo claims, which carried 
more favorable liability standards.54 
More importantly, these ambiguous liability standards disguised the 
fundamental problem that many victims were denied compensation under 
Title VII despite the fact that the sexual harassment culminated in a 
tangible employment action.55  For example, a supervisor’s sexual 
                                                          
(summarizing the “scope of employment” standard). 
 49. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 794 (asserting that sexual harassment serves no employer 
purpose and is accordingly considered a “frolic and detour” under the “scope of 
employment” standard).  See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 70, at 503-05 
(distinguishing an action within the scope of employment, for which the employer is liable, 
from a “frolic and detour,” for which the employer is not liable). 
 50. See, e.g., Steele, 867 F.2d at 1316 n.1 (stating that whenever sexual harassment is 
not within the supervisor’s scope of authority the employer is liable only if the employer 
was negligent in failing to discover and remedy the sexual harassment). 
 51. See, e.g., Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 508 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying a negligence 
standard to determine an employer’s liability for a supervisor’s actions outside the scope of 
employment (citing EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1515-16 (9th Cir. 1989)). 
 52. See, e.g., id. (holding that under a negligence standard the employer is liable only if 
it knew or should have known about the hostile work environment). 
 53. See Baldrate, supra note 35, at 1155 (contending that Meritor’s practical 
consequence was to permit the development of significantly different and irreconcilable 
standards for employer liability).  Compare Steele, 867 F.2d at 1316 (reasoning that 
employer liability after Meritor is governed by whether the supervisor’s action was within 
the scope of the supervisor’s authority to make employment decisions), with Paroline v. 
Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 106 (4th Cir. 1989) (asserting that in hostile work environment 
cases an employer is liable only when it had actual or constructive knowledge that the 
supervisor sexually harassed the employee and did nothing to stop the harassment), Karibian 
v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 780 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying the “aided by the agency” 
standard to employer liability under Title VII), and Ross v. Double Diamond, Inc., 672 F. 
Supp. 261, 274 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (concluding that general Title VII principles permit 
holding an employer strictly liable for a supervisor’s discriminatory actions).  But cf. Guess 
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 464-65 (7th Cir. 1990) (asserting that the confusion 
regarding the proper standard of employer liability under Title VII merely reflects “a 
semantic” problem and that the proper standard is a negligence standard). 
 54. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 753 (1998) (recognizing that 
Meritor encouraged plaintiffs to state claims in terms of quid pro quo harassment because it 
afforded the plaintiff a better chance of holding the employer vicariously liable).  The 
availability of vicarious liability for quid pro quo sexual harassment compelled many 
plaintiffs to state their claim as one of quid pro quo harassment as opposed to hostile 
environment sexual harassment.  Id.  This development put “expansive pressure” on the 
term quid pro quo.  Id.; see, e.g., Nichols, 42 F.3d at 510-11 (providing that whenever a quid 
pro quo claim is established the employer is strictly liable). 
 55. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 753 (emphasizing that the issue in Ms. Ellerth’s case was not 
whether the plaintiff could state a claim for quid pro quo harassment but instead whether the 
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harassment of an employee could culminate in that employee’s termination, 
demotion, or denial of a promotion.56  If unable to demonstrate the presence 
of a quid pro quo demand for sex, however, the victimized employee was 
commonly left uncompensated for his or her injuries.57  Consequently, 
Meritor’s classification of sexual harassment into the rigid categories of 
quid pro quo and hostile work environment overlooked the fact that sexual 
harassment often culminates in a tangible employment action despite the 
absence of a quid pro quo demand for sex.58 
2.  The Court’s decisions in Ellerth and Faragher 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in the companion cases of Burlington 
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton resolved this 
confusion and established a framework in which the presence or absence of 
a tangible employment action became the “guidepost”59 of employer 
liability.60  The Court, recognizing that the terms quid pro quo and hostile 
work environment had “limited utility,”61 established a two-part liability 
                                                          
employer had vicarious liability for the supervisor’s conduct). 
 56. See George, supra note 4, at 14 (postulating that the term tangible employment 
action replaced the term quid pro quo with the effect of distinguishing the nature of the harm 
from the imposition of liability).  A victim’s claim of sexual harassment need not allege a 
quid pro quo demand for sex in order to prove the existence of a tangible employment 
action.  See Lyon & Phillips, supra note 8, at 626 (pointing out that the Court in Ellerth 
appeared to indicate that all sexual harassment cases are to be considered hostile work 
environment cases with some claims alleging a tangible employment action and others not 
alleging such an action). 
 57. See George, supra note 4, at 14 (explaining that plaintiffs often attempted to 
“pigeon-hole” the harassment as a quid pro quo claim).  The rigid distinction between 
hostile work environment and quid pro quo sexual harassment was based on the flawed 
assumption that sexual harassment is solely about sex.  See Richelle Wise Kidder, 
Comment, A Conciliatory Approach to Workplace Harassment:  Burlington Industries, Inc., 
v. Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 1315, 1317-18 (1999) 
(noting that a fundamental misconception of sexual harassment is that it is purely about sex 
when in fact it is often about one individual asserting power over another individual); see, 
e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs. Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (finding an 
actionable claim of sexual harassment even though sexual desire was not a motivating cause 
of the harassment). 
 58. See, e.g., Robinson v. Sappington, 351 F.3d 317, 337 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding a 
tangible employment action where a supervisor reassigned an employee and suggested that 
she resign).  In Robinson, while there was a quid pro quo allegation against the harassing 
supervisor, there was no such allegation against the supervisor who ultimately transferred 
Ms. Robinson and suggested that she resign.  Id. 
 59. Lyon & Phillips, supra note 8, at 633. 
 60. See Kidder, supra note 57, at 1320-23 (summarizing the standards of employer 
liability established in Ellerth and Faragher); Lyon & Phillips, supra note 8, at 626 
(postulating that all sexual harassment cases are now hostile work environment claims and 
are distinguishable based on the presence or absence of a tangible employment action).  
Several commentators laud the Court’s decisions in Ellerth and Faragher for establishing a 
“bright-line test for determining when an employer is or is not automatically liable for the 
sexually harassing conduct of supervisors.”  Id. at 617.  But see Pa. State Police v. Suders, 
542 U.S. 129, 152 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that a negligence standard is the 
appropriate standard for employer liability under Title VII). 
 61. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (providing a cause of 
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standard for all sexual harassment claims.62  Under the first category, 
sexual harassment that culminates in a tangible employment action renders 
the employer automatically liable.63  Under the second category, the 
absence of a tangible employment action provides the employer with the 
opportunity to raise an affirmative defense,64 which consists of two 
elements:  (1) the employer must exercise reasonable care to prevent and 
correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior,65 and (2) the employer 
must prove that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of any 
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to 
otherwise avoid harm.66  Essentially, the Court designed the affirmative 
defense to encourage both employers and employees to take reasonable 
                                                          
action for hostile environment sexual harassment).  While the terms quid pro quo and hostile 
work environment are still recognized as a distinction between two types of sexual 
harassment, the terms have “limited utility” and are most useful for establishing parameters 
of the plaintiff’s prima facie case.  Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751 
(1998); see Paul E. Starkman, Learning the New Rules of Sexual Harassment:  Faragher, 
Ellerth and Beyond, 66 DEF. COUNS. J. 317, 317-19  (1999) (articulating that the terms quid 
pro quo and hostile work environment lack any meaningful and substantive difference); see 
also Fisher v. Electronic Data Systems, 278 F. Supp. 2d 980, 987 (S.D. Iowa 2003) 
(discussing the similarity and difference between quid pro quo sex discrimination and 
hostile work environment sex discrimination); McCormick v. Kmart Distrib. Ctr., 163 F. 
Supp. 2d 807, 824 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (recognizing that while the terms quid pro quo and 
hostile work environment are still valid, they are of limited usefulness in determining 
employer liability for a supervisor’s sexually discriminatory conduct). 
 62. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 804-05 (1998) (establishing a 
framework for employer liability that encourages proactive employer deterrence as well as 
requiring the victimized employee to use reasonable means to make use of any anti-
harassment policy provided by the employer). 
 63. See Caridad v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 294 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(articulating that the Supreme Court’s position in Ellerth and Faragher of limiting employer 
liability was consistent with the traditional “aided by the agency” standard and ensured that 
employer liability would not be absolute); see also Marc A. Hearron, Note, Employment 
Discrimination—Sexual Harassment—First Circuit Holds That Constructive Discharge Is 
Generally Not a Tangible Employment Action, Thereby Not Precluding the Ellerth/Faragher 
Affirmative Defense—Reed v. MBNA Marketing Systems, Inc., 57 SMU L. REV. 481, 485-
86 (2004) (arguing that along with the “aided by the agency” standard, the Supreme Court in 
Ellerth also permitted the use of an intent and negligence standard to determine the liability 
of supervisors acting outside the scope of employment). 
 64. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804 (reconciling the principle of vicarious liability with 
Title VII’s objective of deterring discrimination); see also Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 
(reiterating that an employer is vicariously liable when a supervisor sexually harasses 
another employee but, in the absence of a tangible employment action, may raise an 
affirmative defense to the liability). 
 65. See Jackson v. Arkansas Dep’t of Ed., 272 F.3d 1020, 1025-26 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(concluding that the employer’s remedial response to the plaintiff’s complaint of sexual 
harassment was prompt and thorough and thus satisfied the affirmative defense); Mockler v. 
Multnomah Co., 140 F.3d 808, 812 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that the employer’s corrective 
actions, while taken in response to the victim’s reporting sexual harassment, were 
insufficient to satisfy the first element of the affirmative defense). 
 66. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806-07 (incorporating the avoidable consequence 
doctrine to employer liability under Title VII and concluding that where no tangible 
employment action is taken the employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability by 
proving that the employer instituted an adequate anti-harassment policy which the employee 
unreasonably failed to utilize). 
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steps to deter and correct incidents of sexual harassment.67 
The Supreme Court based its reasoning on the common law “aided by 
the agency” standard for employer liability.68  Under this standard, an 
employer is liable when the agency relationship aids the supervisor in 
sexually harassing the employee.69  Under the Court’s formulation of the 
“aided by the agency” standard, the agency relationship aids a supervisor in 
accomplishing the tort of sexual harassment whenever the supervisor takes 
a tangible employment action against the employee.70  The Court 
recognized that, theoretically, the agency relationship almost always aids 
the supervisor in sexually harassing the employee.71  The employee, for 
example, cannot walk away from a supervisor in the same way that the 
employee can walk away from a mere co-worker.72  The Court reasoned, 
however, that traditional agency principles and Title VII’s deterrent 
function mandate a limited application of the “aided by the agency” 
standard.73  The term tangible employment action provided such a limit.74  
The Supreme Court recognized that when a tangible employment action 
occurs, it is “beyond question” that “more than the mere existence of the 
employment relation aids in commission of the harassment.”75  The 
                                                          
 67. See Kidder, supra note 57, at 1345-48, 1350-53 (recognizing that Ellerth and 
Faragher’s “give-and-take spirit,” which imposes an obligation on both employers and 
employees to take reasonable steps to prevent sexual harassment, aims to deter sexual 
harassment in the workplace). 
 68. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d)(2) (1958) (“A master is not 
subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the scope of their 
employment . . . unless he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the 
agency relation.”). 
 69. Id.; see Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760-61 (applying the “aided by the agency” standard to 
employer liability under Title VII); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 803 (discussing the theoretical 
problems with the “aided by the agency” standard applied to Title VII and establishing the 
affirmative defense as a limit to employer liability). 
 70. See Kidder, supra note 57, at 1321-22 (explaining that due to the requirement of an 
official act of the enterprise, a tangible employment action becomes, for purposes of 
liability, an act of the employer). 
 71. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 803 (recognizing that the employment relationship, 
coupled with the supervisor’s authority, enables the supervisor to sexually harass an 
employee in ways that are unavailable to mere co-workers). 
 72. See id. (detailing how a supervisor’s unique position of authority in the workplace 
enables the supervisor to sexually harass an employee through both official and unofficial 
conduct). 
 73. See id. at 804 (establishing a rule for employer liability to both facilitate Title VII’s 
deterrent objective and adhere to Meritor’s admonition to avoid a rule of automatic 
liability); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764 (emphasizing that Title VII is designed to encourage the 
creation of anti-harassment policies to avoid litigation and promote conciliation); see also 
Marks, supra note 11, at 1418 (explaining that the Supreme Court in Ellerth and Faragher 
used the affirmative defense to limit an employer’s liability in order to avoid a liability 
standard that imposed strict liability on the employer). 
 74. See Scott, supra note 4, at 168 (explicating that the Court in Ellerth, in recognizing 
that the “aided by the agency” standard could be interpreted to cover all supervisory 
conduct, decided to limit the agency standard to a class of conduct that was clearly aided by 
the existence of an agency relationship). 
 75. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761 (importing the concept of a tangible employment actions 
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presence of a tangible employment action is the link that renders the 
employer liable for the supervisor’s sexual harassment of an employee; 
absent a tangible employment action, no connection exists with which to 
hold the employer automatically liable.76 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Ellerth and Faragher laid the 
groundwork for determining employer liability in the context of sexual 
harassment but left much of the application ambiguous.77  For instance, by 
failing to identify the scope of the term tangible employment action, the 
Court left unanswered the question of whether a constructive discharge, 
which occurs when an employee’s work environment becomes so 
intolerable that the employee is forced to resign,78 was a per se tangible 
employment action.79  This ambiguity led to divergent views among the 
lower federal courts and to contentious debate among legal scholars.80 
                                                          
developed in lower courts to the resolution of the issue of vicarious liability for claims of 
hostile work environment sexual harassment); accord Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 456 
(3d Cir. 2003), vacated by 542 U.S. 129 (2004) (interpreting the Supreme Court’s language 
in Faragher as providing a non-exhaustive list of cases that qualify as tangible employment 
actions). 
 76. See Justin P. Smith, Note, Letting the Master Answer:  Employer Liability for 
Sexual Harassment in the Workplace After Faragher and Burlington Industries, 74 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1786, 1800 (1999) (articulating that the extent to which the agency relationship aided 
the supervisor is logically related to the extent the employer caused the sexual harassment). 
 77. See Sara Kagay, Applying the Ellerth Defense to Constructive Discharge:  An 
Affirmative Answer, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1046-47 (2000) (explaining that the central 
unanswered question after the Court’s decisions in Ellerth and Faragher related to how 
courts should classify an employee’s constructive discharge for purposes of employer 
liability). 
 78. See Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 146 (2004) (recognizing that to 
establish a claim for hostile work environment sexual harassment, an employee must 
demonstrate that the working conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable person would 
have felt compelled to resign).  There is still minor disagreement among the circuit courts as 
to the appropriate standard to use in evaluating claims of constructive discharge.  See Baker 
v. John Morrell & Co., 382 F.3d 816, 829 (8th Cir. 2004) (asserting that to establish a 
constructive discharge a plaintiff must prove that the employer’s actions were taken with the 
specific intent of forcing the employee to quit); EEOC v. Grief Bros. Corp., No. 02-CV-
468S, 2004 WL 2202641, at *16 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2004) (contending that the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Suders did not alter the Second Circuit’s requirement that an employee 
alleging a constructive discharge must prove deliberate employer action); Luciano v. Coca-
Cola Enter., Inc., No. 02-10895-RGS, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17186, at *6 (D. Mass. Aug. 
30, 2004) (asserting the evidentiary standard a plaintiff must meet to establish a claim for 
hostile work environment constructive discharge). 
 79. See, e.g., Suders, 325 F.3d at 455 (determining that a constructive discharge falls 
within the Ellerth and Faragher definition of a tangible employment action). 
 80. Compare Kagay, supra note 77, at 1056 (declaring that the absence of the term 
constructive discharge from the list of tangible employment actions the Supreme Court 
enumerated in Ellerth and Faragher implied that the Court did not intend for a constructive 
discharge to be considered a tangible employment action), with Hearron, supra note 63, at 
486-87 (arguing that allowing the affirmative defense for constructive discharge actually 
increases the likelihood of an employer being held liable for sexual harassment because in 
order for a plaintiff to prove a constructive discharge, the plaintiff must essentially disprove 
one element of the affirmative defense).  Central to Hearron’s argument is that a plaintiff 
bears the burden of proof for a constructive discharge while the employer bears the burden 
of proof for the affirmative defense.  Id.  Under this argument, employers would actually 
ELSENHEIMER OFFTOPRINTER 2/24/2006  2:45:15 PM 
1648 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol 54:1635 
B.  Constructive Discharge within the Ellerth and Faragher Framework—
Lower Court Disagreement 
A constructive discharge occurs when an employee’s working conditions 
become so intolerable that a reasonable person in the employee’s position 
would feel compelled to resign.81  The Court’s holdings in Ellerth and 
Faragher, however, did not clarify whether a constructive discharge, by 
itself, constituted a tangible employment action—an omission that caused 
contentious disagreement among the circuit courts.82 
For example, the Second Circuit in Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter 
Railroad, held that a hostile work environment constructive discharge does 
not constitute a tangible employment action and reasoned that a 
constructive discharge differs significantly from an actual discharge.83  Ms. 
Caridad resigned from her employment with Metro-North after being 
sexually harassed84 and argued that her constructive discharge was a 
tangible employment action under Ellerth and Faragher.85  According to 
the Second Circuit, a constructive discharge, which does not necessarily 
involve an exercise of company authority, differs from an actual discharge, 
which is always a direct exercise of company authority.86  Under this 
reasoning, therefore, a constructive discharge is not a per se tangible 
employment action.87 
In Suders v. Easton, in contrast, the Third Circuit held that a constructive 
discharge constitutes a tangible employment action.88  Here, three male 
                                                          
benefit from a rule imposing automatic liability for claims of constructive discharge.  Id. 
 81. Suders, 542 U.S. at 141. 
 82. Id. at 139-40. 
 83. See Caridad v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 295 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(clarifying that while a previous Second Circuit case stated that a constructive discharge is 
treated as if the employee had actually been fired, for purposes of employer liability, the two 
terms are not identical). 
 84. See id. at 290-91 (recounting the details of Ms. Caridad’s experience as an 
employee of Metro-North). 
 85. Id. at 294. 
 86. See id. at 295 (contending that for purposes of employer liability, an actual 
discharge differs from a constructive discharge).  But see Cathy Shuck, Comment, That’s It, 
I Quit:  Returning to First Principles in Constructive Discharge Doctrine, 23 BERKELY J. 
EMP. & LAB.  L. 401, 443-44 (2002) (asserting that the specific intent standard for proving a 
constructive discharge necessarily implies that the employer deliberately forced the 
employee to quit).  Under the specific intent standard, a constructive discharge is essentially 
identical to an actual discharge:  both require the employer’s actual intent to force the 
employee to leave.  Id. (noting that in Circuits following a specific intent standard for 
constructive discharge, a view of constructive discharge as different than an actual discharge 
is “particularly perverse”). 
 87. See Caridad, 191 F.3d at 294 (summarizing the “aided by the agency” standard for 
employer liability under Title VII); Kagay, supra note 77, at 1057 (explaining that 
Caridad’s holding was based on a view of the “aided by the agency” standard in which a 
tangible employment action occurs only when the employer is implicated in the supervisor’s 
sexual harassment of the employee). 
 88. See Chamallas, supra note 10, at 338 (asserting that while Caridad emphasized the 
“constructive” aspect of a constructive discharge, Suders v. Easton emphasized the 
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supervisors sexually harassed Ms. Suders, a secretary at a state police 
barracks in Pennsylvania.89  The supervisors performed obscene gestures in 
front of Ms. Suders, made vulgar remarks about sexuality, and mocked her 
because of her age and gender.90  As part of her job, Ms. Suders was 
required to pass a computer skills exam.91  Each time Ms. Suders took the 
exam, however, her supervisors falsely informed her that she failed.92  
Shortly after taking the exam a third time, Ms. Suders discovered her 
previous exams hidden in a file cabinet and concluded that the exams had 
never been submitted for review.93  The supervisors, realizing that Ms. 
Suders had found the hidden exams, accused her of theft, placed handcuffs 
on her, and took her photograph as if she had been arrested.94  In response, 
Ms. Suders resigned.95 
The Third Circuit held that a constructive discharge, which is the legal 
equivalent of an actual discharge, is a tangible employment action under 
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Ellerth and Faragher.96  According to the 
Third Circuit, the lack of official documentation is irrelevant because in 
creating working conditions so intolerable that an employee is forced to 
resign, the harassing supervisor effectively exercises company authority.97  
For the Third Circuit, therefore, a constructive discharge is, for purposes of 
employer liability, a tangible employment action.98 
                                                          
“discharge” aspect of a constructive discharge).  Compare Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 
460 (3d Cir. 2003), vacated by 542 U.S. 129 (2004) (stressing that when a plaintiff bears the 
burden of proving a constructive discharge, the resignation is the functional equivalent of an 
actual discharge), with Caridad, 191 F.3d at 294 (contending that a constructive discharge 
can arise out of entirely unofficial conduct and thus bears little indicia of a tangible 
employment action). 
 89. Suders, 325 F.3d at 436. 
 90. Id. at 436-37. 
 91. See id. at 439 (summarizing the requirements for passing the computer skills exam). 
 92. See id. (noting that Ms. Suders believed her supervisors were lying when they told 
her about her test results). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See id. at 458 (stating that a constructive discharge is a tangible employment action 
because it is fundamentally the functional equivalent of an actual discharge); see also 
Goldsmith, supra note 19, at 844-45 (claiming that the Third Circuit’s approach to Ms. 
Suders’ case did not address the paramount problem as to whether the actions underlying 
Ms. Suders’ allegations of sexual harassment constituted official employer conduct). 
 97. See Suders, 325 F.3d at 459 (declaring that the proper inquiry focuses on the 
supervisor’s actions to determine if the supervisor is exercising the official power of the 
company).  But see Kagay, supra note 77, at 1056-58 (contending that a supervisor does not 
exercise company authority when the supervisor creates a hostile work environment, even if 
the supervisor’s actions result in a constructive discharge). 
 98. See Suders, 325 F.3d at 450, 458 (asserting that the Ellerth and Faragher 
application of traditional agency principles to employer liability under Title VII compels the 
conclusion that a constructive discharge, even though it does not bear the company’s 
approval as an actual discharge would, must still be considered a tangible employment 
action for purposes of holding the employer strictly liable); Hearron, supra note 63, at 483-
85 (summarizing the Supreme Court’s application of the “aided by the agency” standard to 
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Suders to resolve the issue of 
whether a constructive discharge brought about by supervisor harassment is 
a per se tangible employment action.99  According to the Supreme Court, 
the fundamental difference between an actual discharge and a constructive 
discharge is that a constructive discharge does not necessarily require an 
official act of the company.100  The Supreme Court reasoned that in most 
cases a tangible employment action “‘is documented in official company 
records, and may be subject to review by higher level supervisors.’”101  A 
purely hostile work environment, in contrast, entails no official 
documentation.102  Accordingly, for purposes of employer liability, a 
constructive discharge, if not precipitated by an official act, differs 
significantly from an actual discharge.103 
To illustrate its definition of a tangible employment action, the Court 
pointed to Reed v. MBNA Marketing Systems, Inc.,104 and Robinson v. 
Sappington,105 where the courts held that a constructive discharge is not a 
tangible employment action unless accompanied by an official act.  In 
Reed, the court held that the supervisor’s unfulfilled threats to the 
employee were not based on the supervisor’s official power within the 
                                                          
employer liability under Title VII and arguing that because a constructive discharge is a 
significant change in employment status it is the equivalent of an actual discharge under 
Ellerth and Faragher). 
 99. See Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 150-51 (2004) (determining that a 
constructive discharge is not, per se, a tangible employment action). 
 100. See id. at 145 (championing the view that a tangible employment action does not 
occur, nor is the “aided by the agency” standard triggered, in the absence of an official 
company act).  But see Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d at 460 (positing that when a plaintiff 
satisfies the burden of proving a constructive discharge the constructive discharge should be 
treated as if it were an actual discharge and thus meets the requirements of a tangible 
employment action under Ellerth and Faragher because it “constitutes a significant change 
in employment status”); Goldsmith, supra note 19, at 845-46 (articulating a uniform 
standard for constructive discharge claims to ensure that a cognizable constructive discharge 
claim implicates the employer in the plaintiff’s resignation). 
 101. Suders, 542 U.S. at 144-45 (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 
762 (1998)); see id. at 149 (noting that the Third Circuit’s definition of constructive 
discharge as a tangible employment action is anomalous because the Third Circuit’s holding 
“would make the graver claim of hostile-environment constructive discharge easier to prove 
than its lesser included component, hostile work environment.”); see also Kagay, supra note 
77, at 1055-56 (contending that a constructive discharge is not a tangible employment action 
and that the use of the affirmative defense in constructive discharge cases advances Title 
VII’s policy objectives of deterrence, conciliation between employers and employees, and 
the development of anti-harassment policies). 
 102. See Suders, 542 U.S. at 144-45 (differentiating between an official act and merely 
unofficial conduct which any employee could inflict on another employee). 
 103. See id. at 148 (asserting that while an official company act always precipitates an 
actual discharge, an official act does not necessarily cause a constructive discharge); cf. 
Kagay, supra note 77, at 1055-57 (recognizing that a purely hostile work environment 
constructive discharge does not fit within the same category as a tangible employment 
action). 
 104. 333 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 105. 351 F.3d 317 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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company.106  Thus, the supervisor’s actions were entirely unofficial and did 
not constitute a tangible employment action.107  In contrast, the Robinson 
court held that the supervisor’s decision to transfer the employee and the 
threat that the new position would be “hell” was an official act that 
rendered the constructive discharge a tangible employment action.108 
The Supreme Court suggested that Reed and Robinson indicate the path 
that lower courts should take in determining the presence or absence of a 
tangible employment action.109  Thus, under Suders, a constructive 
discharge is a tangible employment action only when an official act causes 
the plaintiff’s resignation.110  In the absence of an official act, the employer 
may assert an affirmative defense to vicarious liability.111 
C.  The Affirmative Defense Framework as a Powerful Tool to Avoid 
Liability 
A broad definition of the term tangible employment action is crucial for 
victims of sexual harassment.  A narrow definition of this term permits 
employers to raise the affirmative defense and avoid liability even in cases 
where the agency relationship aided the supervisor in carrying out the 
sexual harassment.112  To successfully raise the affirmative defense, the 
employer must merely demonstrate the presence of an adequate internal 
complaint procedure that the employee unreasonably failed to use.113  The 
                                                          
 106. 333 F.3d at 33. 
 107. See id. (“[The supervisor’s] behavior is exactly the kind of wholly unauthorized 
conduct for which the affirmative defense was designed.”).  But see Recent Cases, 
Employment Law—Vicarious Liability—First Circuit Holds That Classification of 
Constructive Discharge as a Tangible Employment Action Should Be Left to Case-by-Case 
Determination—Reed v. MBNA Marketing Systems, Inc., 333 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2003), 117 
HARV. L. REV. 1004, 1010 (2004) [hereinafter Recent Cases] (criticizing Reed for failing to 
recognize that a constructive discharge actually makes official an otherwise unofficial 
action). 
 108. See 351 F.3d at 336-39 (emphasizing that the decision had been made by the 
presiding judge acting in his official capacity, and thus, the presence of an official act 
rendered the decision a tangible employment action). 
 109. See Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 149 (2004) (highlighting that Ellerth 
and Faragher divided constructive discharge claims based on the presence or absence of an 
official act).  The Court cited to Reed and Robinson to “indicate how the ‘official act’ (or 
‘tangible employment action’) criterion should play out when constructive discharge is 
alleged.”  Id.  
 110. Id. at 148. 
 111. Id.; see id. at 137-38 (citing Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 
(1998)) (summarizing the affirmative defense available to the employer if the plaintiff is 
unable to prove the existence of a tangible employment action). 
 112. See Dedner v. Oklahoma, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1259-60 (E.D. Okla. 1999) 
(providing an example of the relative ease of raising the affirmative defense to vicarious 
liability). 
 113. The affirmative defense framework, however, has been criticized for a number of 
reasons.  See Chamallas, supra note 10, at 354 (noting that the affirmative defense 
framework for employer liability has provided a rich source of legal principles with which 
to successfully fend off liability).  One prominent criticism of the affirmative defense is that 
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affirmative defense, which is based on the notion of contributory 
negligence,114 routinely results in summary judgment victories for 
employers.115  The relative ease of successfully raising the affirmative 
                                                          
the requirement that the victim report the sexual harassment ignores statistical evidence 
indicating that several factors contribute to harassment victims’ unwillingness or inability to 
report sexual harassment.  See Theresa M. Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge:  The 
Implications of Social Science Research on Imputing Liability to Employers for Sexual 
Harassment, 7 WM. & MARY J. OF WOMEN & L. 273, 323-24 (2001) (contending that the 
affirmative defense articulated in Ellerth and Faragher places an undue burden on the 
victim of sexual harassment to explain any failure to report the sexual harassment).  
According to social science research, very few victims report sexual harassment.  Id. at 306-
07, 312.  In a study of federal workers, only twelve percent of victims of sexual harassment 
actually reported the incident.  Id. at 312; see Anne Lawton, Operating in an Empirical 
Vacuum:  The Ellerth and Faragher Affirmative Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 
209 (2004) (contending that Ellerth and Faragher is in discord with empirical studies 
showing that it is actually “reasonable” for victims not to report sexual harassment).  
Additionally, the affirmative defense is criticized for creating a technical loophole through 
which employers can avoid all liability.  Marks, supra note 11, at 1422-28.  The author 
identifies two lines of cases.  Id. at 1423.  The first line of cases treats an employer’s 
diligence in establishing an anti-harassment policy as an independent defense to liability.  
Id.; see, e.g., Watkins v. Prof’l Bureau, Ltd., No. 98-2555, 1999 WL 1032614, at *5 (4th 
Cir. Nov. 15, 1999) (concluding that a plaintiff’s failure to utilize an employer’s adequate 
anti-harassment policy will, in most circumstances, satisfy the employer’s burden of proving 
that the employee unreasonably failed to use an internal complaint procedure).  The second 
line of cases treats any failure on the plaintiff’s part to report the harassment as a complete 
bar to recovery for injuries arising out of the sexual harassment.  See Marks, supra note 11, 
at 1428-29 (identifying a trend among lower courts in which any failure of the plaintiff to 
report the harassment is deemed contributory negligence, and thus a complete bar to 
recovery); e.g., Jackson v. Arkansas Dep’t of Ed., 272 F.3d 1020, 1026 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(concluding that because the plaintiff waited nine months to report the sexual harassment, 
the employer met the second element of the affirmative defense); Madray v. Publix 
Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F.3d 1290, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000) (concluding that complaints to 
anyone other than the person designated in the company’s anti-harassment policy does not 
satisfy the reasonable complaint requirement and allows the employer to satisfy the second 
element of the affirmative defense); Dedner, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 1260 (finding that the 
employee unreasonably failed to use the employer’s anti-harassment complaint procedure 
even though the employee believed, based on observations of other employees’ experiences, 
that the procedure was futile). 
 114. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998) (noting that Title 
VII borrows from tort law the avoidable consequences doctrine which encourages 
employees to report sexual harassment before it becomes severe); Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 
458 U.S. 219, 231-32 (1982) (recognizing that a Title VII claimant has the duty to mitigate 
damages).  See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 65, at 458 (summarizing the 
avoidable consequences doctrine as one which requires a plaintiff to avoid damages after the 
wrong has occurred). 
 115. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806-07 (1998) (reinforcing, 
through the establishment of an affirmative defense, Title VII’s duel objectives of 
“encouraging forethought by employers” and providing redress for injured employees).  
Title VII’s primary goal is to end discrimination.  See McKennon v. Nashville Banner 
Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995) (“Congress designed the remedial measures in [Title 
VII] as a spur or catalyst to cause employers to self-examine and to self-evaluate their 
employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges of 
discrimination.” (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975))).  
Title VII’s secondary purpose is to compensate victims for their injuries when unlawful 
discrimination does occur.  Id.; see Ford Motor Co., 458 U.S. at 230 (stating that the victims 
of job discrimination “want jobs, not lawsuits”); see also Grossman, supra note 1, at 27 
(noting that the affirmative defense and related liability rules established in Ellerth and 
Faragher are designed to contribute to Title VII’s goals of deterrence and compensation). 
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defense effectively means that in the absence of a tangible employment 
action many claims will be dismissed at summary judgment.116  A narrow 
construction of this term will enable employers to avoid liability even when 
the victim’s injuries arose out of the supervisor’s exercise of company 
authority.117  A situation permitting employers to avoid liability when the 
agency relationship implicates them in the sexual harassment is contrary to 
the Supreme Court’s definition of the “aided by the agency” standard as 
well as Title VII’s goal of compensating victims of sexual harassment.118 
II. INTRODUCING CONSEQUENTIAL ECONOMIC LOSS TO SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT LAW 
Given the liability framework for sexual harassment that currently 
affords employers sufficient protection against liability, the term tangible 
employment action should not be construed to eviscerate the agency 
standards the Court designed to govern an employer’s liability for 
supervisory-based sexual harassment.119  To meaningfully appreciate the 
                                                          
 116. See George, supra note 30, at 156 (underscoring that since Ellerth and Faragher, 
summary judgment is often granted for the defendant on the issue of employer liability 
without any inquiry into the respective proof burdens the parties bear).  George is concerned 
that many courts ignore the high burden of proof on defendants moving for summary 
judgment, thus increasing the number of cases dismissed at summary judgment.  Id. 
 117. See Chamallas, supra note 10, at 325-26 (underscoring that the affirmative defense 
is not difficult to raise in the absence of a tangible employment action). 
 118. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806-07 (summarizing how the affirmative defense 
framework accomplishes the objective of preventing and deterring discrimination).  But see 
Lawton, supra note 113, at 210 (positing that lower courts have interpreted the Supreme 
Court’s Ellerth and Faragher decisions as requiring only that the employer promulgate an 
anti-harassment policy).  The affirmative defense framework reveals that Ellerth and 
Faragher have done “little to reduce employer incentives to reduce the incidence of sexual 
harassment by supervisors in the workplace.”  Id.; see OPPENHEIMER, supra note 3, at 282 
(contending that to view Ellerth and Faragher as a perfect reflection of agency principles is 
to risk permitting courts to shift the burden of proving sexual harassment to employees). 
 119. See McCann, supra note 13, at 782 (emphasizing that the presence of a tangible 
employment action is of “paramount” importance to victims of sexual harassment).  If the 
term tangible employment action is defined narrowly, the employer will most likely be able 
to successfully raise an affirmative defense to vicarious liability.  See Grossman, supra note 
1, at 21, 24-25 (concluding, based on empirical evidence, that the low reporting rate among 
victims of sexual harassment permits employers to easily satisfy the second prong of the 
affirmative defense); Marks, supra note 11, at 1435-36 (positing that the Ellerth and 
Faragher affirmative defense has significantly increased the likelihood that employers will 
be able to avoid liability).  Ellerth and Faragher’s practical effect is a “guaranteed safe 
harbor against claims of supervisory harassment.”  Id.; see, e.g., Reinhold v. Virginia, 151 
F.3d 172, 175 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that being assigned to extra work does not constitute 
a tangible employment action).  In Reinhold, the court determined that, in light of Ellerth 
and Faragher, the supervisor’s actions did not constitute a tangible employment action.  151 
F.3d at 175.  The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals had previously denied the defendant 
employer’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and held that the supervisor’s actions 
constituted a tangible job detriment sufficient to support a quid pro quo claim of sexual 
harassment.  Reinhold v. Virginia, 135 F.3d 920, 933-34 (4th Cir. 1998), vacated by 151 
F.3d 172 (4th Cir. 1998).  But in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Ellerth and 
Faragher, the Fourth Circuit, upon defendant’s appeal from the denial of defendant’s 
motion for judgment as a matter of law, held that the supervisor’s actions did not constitute 
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agency principles underlying the Supreme Court’s liability framework, this 
Comment argues that the term tangible employment action should be 
broadly construed to include two categories of supervisory conduct:  (1) 
conduct that causes a direct economic loss,120 and (2) a more controversial 
category that includes conduct that results in consequential economic 
loss.121  This Comment will demonstrate that the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Suders, as well as the “aided by the agency” standard and Title 
VII’s deterrent and remedial objectives, can be read to support this 
definition.122 
 A.  Direct and Consequential Economic Loss 
When the supervisor’s actions constitute direct economic loss, a tangible 
employment action clearly occurs.123  In the context of tort law, direct 
damages constitute those damages that are the immediate result of the 
tortfeasor’s negligent conduct and may be calculated based on the 
depreciation to the plaintiff’s assets.124  When a plaintiff’s car is damaged, 
for example, the car’s market-value depreciation constitutes the direct 
damage.125  In Ellerth, the Supreme Court stated that “[a] tangible 
employment action in most cases inflicts direct economic harm.”126  The 
Ellerth Court’s use of the phrase direct economic harm, therefore, refers to 
official conduct that, by itself, results in immediate and inevitable 
economic loss.127  The Court explained that where the supervisor’s conduct, 
such as firing or failing to promote, constitutes direct economic loss, the 
                                                          
a tangible employment action.  Reinhold, 151 F.3d at 174-75. 
 120. See, e.g., Dinkins v. Charoen Pokphand U.S.A., Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1263 
(M.D. Ala. 2001) (concluding that without question, a tangible employment action may be 
found when an employee is terminated because a termination is an ultimate employment 
decision with a significant change in employment benefits). 
 121. See Starkman, supra note 61, at 323 (contending that future injuries such as 
decreased opportunities for career advancement may qualify as a tangible employment 
action). 
 122. See infra Part III.C. (contending that Suders supports a broad definition of the term 
tangible employment action). 
 123. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761-62 (1998) (providing 
examples of conduct that constitutes direct economic loss, such as firing or demotion, in 
which the supervisor is aided, beyond question, by the presence of the agency relationship); 
see, e.g., Dinkins, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 1263 (setting out that terminations are clearly tangible 
employment actions because they involve direct economic loss). 
 124. See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.3(3) (2d ed. 1993) (explaining that one 
method of determining general damages is to calculate the loss in market value to the 
property as a result of the tort). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762. 
 127. See Dinkins, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 1263 (stating that the plaintiffs’ terminations were 
beyond question tangible employment actions because the termination was an official act of 
the company that constituted a direct economic loss); Kagay, supra note 77, at 1056-57 
(highlighting that the presence of direct economic loss manifests many of the key indicators 
of a tangible employment action). 
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presence of the agency relationship is obvious.128 
Similarly, courts should also recognize the presence of a tangible 
employment action when a supervisor’s conduct leads to consequential 
economic loss.129  Consequential economic loss, a term drawn from tort 
law,130 is defined as loss that may arise from the harm to the plaintiff but 
which is not the direct and immediate result of the original “harm to the 
plaintiff’s entitlement.”131  Consequential economic loss, in contrast to 
direct economic loss, is harm, such as lost wages, which is the “natural, but 
not the necessary” or immediate result of the harmful act.132  This category 
of economic loss generally entails two elements:  (1) the loss must be 
established with reasonable certainty, and (2) the loss must be proximately 
caused by the unlawful conduct.133 
                                                          
 128. See Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 456 (3d Cir. 2003), vacated by 542 U.S. 129 
(2004) (commenting that the Supreme Court’s use of the clause “such as” in Ellerth to 
describe the actions constituting a tangible employment action evinced the Supreme Court’s 
recognition that official conduct is often not easily categorized as a discharge, demotion, or 
transfer); Jin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 84, 93 (2d Cir. 2002) (contending that the list 
of conduct that constitutes a tangible employment action is not limited to the actions listed 
in Ellerth).  While conduct that results in direct economic loss is commonly an ultimate 
hiring decision, not all tangible employment actions need to be ultimate hiring decisions.  
See Durham Life Ins. Co., v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 153 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding a tangible 
employment action where the plaintiff was given assignments that resulted in lower pay). 
 129. See Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 152 n.11 (2004) (remanding the case 
for a fact-finder to decide whether the events surrounding Ms. Suders’ computer skills exam 
were sufficient to constitute a tangible employment action); Durham Life, 166 F.3d at 153-
54 (holding that the loss of important files, an office, and secretarial staff constitute a 
tangible employment action).  But see Reinhold v. Virginia, 151 F.3d 172, 175 (4th Cir. 
1998) (finding no tangible employment action where the supervisor assigned the employee 
extra work, gave her inappropriate work assignments, and denied her the opportunity to 
attend a professional conference and thus permitting the employer to raise the affirmative 
defense to vicarious liability). 
 130. See DOBBS, supra note 124, § 3.3(4) (providing that the term “consequential 
damages” refers to damages that arise out of the tort but are not the necessary or immediate 
result of that tort).  Courts apply the terms “direct” and “consequential” damages in a variety 
of ways.  See 25 C.J.S. Damages § 3 (2002) (summarizing the differences between several 
categories of damages).  The various methods courts use to calculate damages are outside 
the scope of this article and the numerous variations do not affect the substance of this 
argument. 
 131. DOBBS, supra note 124, § 3.3(4); see 22 AM. JUR. 2D § 40 (2004) (“Special damages 
are the natural, but not the necessary, result of an injury.”); see also District of Columbia v. 
Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. Civ.A. 0428-00, 2002 WL 31811717, at *41 (D.C. Super. Dec. 
16, 2002) (“Classically, the term ‘consequential damages’ means those losses or injuries 
‘which are a result of an act but are not direct and immediate.’” (quoting BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 352 (5th ed. 1979))); cf. Chamallas, supra note 10, at 341 (arguing that 
discussions of liability hinge on normative judgments of who is ultimately responsible for 
causing injuries arising out of sexual harassment). 
 132. 22 AM. JUR. 2d § 40; see Bogen v. Green, 239 A.2d 154, 156 (D.C. App. 1968) 
(recognizing that consequential damages could be found when a plaintiff was unable to 
work and lost income as a result of her injury). 
 133. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 110, at 766-67 (summarizing the difference 
between direct and consequential damages in the context of fraud and misrepresentation).  
Direct damages occur when something of value is lost.  Id. § 110, at 766.  Consequential 
damages, in contrast, do not involve the direct transfer or transaction in something of value.  
Id. § 110, at 766-67.  Consequential damages require two elements:  (1) they must be 
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As with direct economic loss, the concept of consequential economic 
loss can be applied to sexual harassment law where victims often suffer 
economic loss that arises from the harassment even though it is not the 
direct and immediate result of the supervisor’s original discriminatory 
conduct.  While the presence of a tangible employment action may be less 
clear in cases involving consequential economic loss, this construction is 
consistent with workplace reality, which is far more complex than a narrow 
category of tangible employment actions.134  If, for example, a supervisor, 
due to discriminatory animus, prevents an employee from attending several 
professional conferences, this action does not result in immediate or direct 
economic harm such as wage or job loss.135  Yet the supervisor’s conduct 
can result in consequential economic harm which arises from the 
discrimination.136  The supervisor’s actions, for example, may deprive the 
employee of networking opportunities, professional training, and career 
development.137  As a result, the plaintiff may be denied a promotion, 
                                                          
established with reasonable certainty and may include loss that is reasonably certain to 
occur in the future; and (2) they must be proximately caused by the unlawful conduct.  Id. § 
110, at 767.  See also Maryland use of Pumphrey v. Manor Real Estate & Trust Co., 83 F. 
Supp. 91, 102 (D. Md. 1949) (“Direct damages include all such injurious consequences as 
proceed from or have direct causal connection with such consequences.  Consequential 
damages are those which the cause in question naturally but indirectly produces.”). 
 134. See Chamallas, supra note 10, at 347-48 (noting that a formalist approach 
emphasizes a supervisor’s formal decisions and policies rather than the supervisor’s specific 
actions taken while acting as an agent of the company). 
 135. Compare Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 153 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(suggesting a broad interpretation of the term tangible employment actions), with Reinhold 
v. Virginia, 151 F.3d 172, 175 (4th Cir. 1998) (providing, in light of the Court’s decision in 
Ellerth, a narrow construction of the term tangible employment actions that precludes 
conduct that has the potential of resulting in a significant change in employment status). 
 136. See McCann, supra note 13, at 782-83 (acknowledging the possibility that tangible 
employment actions include conduct that is equivalent to a demotion or reassignment).  
Although the agency relationship may be less clear, conduct that does not constitute direct 
economic loss remains a tangible employment action if the conduct results in consequential 
economic loss.  See, e.g., Durham Life, 166 F.3d at 153 (finding a tangible employment 
action where the supervisor’s conduct, while not itself constituting direct economic loss, had 
an extremely high probability of causing the plaintiff substantial economic loss); Glickstein 
v. Neshaminy Sch. Dist., No. 96-6236, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 727, at *36-37 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 
26, 1999) (analyzing the term tangible employment action and concluding that a 
supervisor’s conduct is tangible when it substantially decreases an employee’s earning 
potential); see also Thompson v. Naphcare, Inc., No. 04-60028, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 
23697, at *14-15 (5th Cir. Nov. 11, 2004) (finding that a supervisor’s conduct was not a 
tangible employment action where the supervisor merely scrutinized the employee’s work, 
extended her probationary period an extra forty-five days, and gave her a verbal and written 
reprimand for a mistake); Watts v. Kroger, 170 F.3d 505, 510 (5th Cir. 1999) (concluding 
that a change in work schedule, different job assignments, and requiring an employee to 
check with a supervisor before breaks does not qualify as a tangible employment action 
because the actions are merely minor employment changes and not significant changes in 
employment status). 
 137. See Starkman, supra note 61, at 323 (suggesting that while the precise definition of 
a tangible employment action remains amorphous, the term may include future injuries and 
diminished career opportunities).  But see Reinhold, 151 F.3d at 175 (finding no tangible 
employment action where the plaintiff was denied the opportunity to attend a professional 
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forced to look elsewhere for a job, or prevented from lateral career 
advancement.138  In this situation, economic loss that is a reasonably 
foreseeable consequence of the supervisor’s official conduct constitutes a 
tangible employment action despite the absence of direct economic harm to 
the plaintiff. 
 B.  The “Aided by the Agency” Standard 
 1.  Agency and consequential economic loss 
Under the “aided by the agency” standard, which supports a broad 
construction of the term “tangible employment action,” an employer is 
liable when the agency relationship aids the supervisor in carrying out the 
sexual harassment.139  Cases of direct economic loss, where the 
supervisor’s conduct constitutes immediate and identifiable economic loss, 
clearly invoke the agency relationship.140  In the absence of direct 
economic loss, however, courts must determine if the economic loss arose 
out of official conduct and was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of 
that conduct.141  If so, a tangible employment action should be found.142  
Under this interpretation, the official conduct for which the employer is 
liable is not limited to an exhaustive list of actions that constitute direct 
economic loss; rather, the supervisor’s official conduct is a tangible 
employment action whenever it results in direct or consequential economic 
loss.143 
This construction is consistent with the “aided by the agency” standard 
because it retains the characteristics of official conduct essential to the 
                                                          
conference and was assigned extra and inappropriate work assignments); George, supra note 
4, at 14-15 (suggesting that Ellerth, with its use of the term “tangible employment action”, 
provided a more stringent liability standard). 
 138. See Durham Life, 166 F.3d at 153 (finding a tangible employment action where the 
supervisor’s conduct, even though not itself economic loss, is reasonably likely to lead to 
economic loss). 
 139. See Scott, supra note 4, at 168 (noting that the Court recognized that the “aided by 
the agency” standard could either limit or expand the scope of employer liability). 
 140. David Monassebian, Note, Current Developments in the Law:  A Survey of Federal 
Cases Involving Employer Vicarious Liability for Sexual Harassment:  Burlington 
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 188 S.Ct. 2257 (1998), 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 175, 177-78 (1998) 
(articulating that a supervisor is better equipped than other employees to inflict direct 
economic harm on a victim of sexual harassment). 
 141. See Smith, supra note 76, at 1800 (asserting that the “aided by the agency” standard 
essentially looks toward the degree to which the employer caused the sexual harassment 
through the supervisor’s exercise of official company authority). 
 142. See, e.g., Glickstein v. Neshaminy Sch. Dist., No. 96-6236, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
727, at *36-37 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 1999) (underscoring that the supervisor’s exercise of 
company authority in taking specific actions against the plaintiff was sufficient to create an 
issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff suffered a tangible employment action). 
 143. Cf. Chamallas, supra note 10, at 347-48 (maintaining that the presence of a tangible 
employment action should be evaluated according to a supervisor’s actions and decision-
making process rather than the company’s formal decisions). 
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imposition of automatic employer liability.144  Indeed, the presence of an 
official act remains the link between the employer and the injured 
employee.145  This approach, therefore, merely modifies the analysis of 
how a supervisor’s conduct manifests company authority and inflicts 
economic loss on victims of sexual harassment.146 
To satisfy the Supreme Court’s standard for determining employer 
liability, courts must closely scrutinize the context of a supervisor’s 
discriminatory conduct to determine whether the supervisor exercised 
company authority and whether such conduct is reasonably certain to 
proximately cause consequential economic loss.147  The Court’s definition 
of a tangible employment action as a “significant change in employment 
status,” does not imply that a court’s inquiry ceases upon a finding that the 
conduct lacks direct economic loss.148  Rather, the “aided by the agency” 
standard requires courts to evaluate the possible economic consequences 
that are likely to flow from official conduct, such as diminished career 
opportunities and future wage loss.149  These economic consequences, 
while possibly less direct than a firing or a demotion, nonetheless represent 
significant changes in the victim’s employment status.150  This approach 
ensures that victims of sexual harassment who have suffered a significant 
change in employment status as a result of a supervisor’s exercise of 
official company power are justly compensated for their loss.151  The 
“aided by the agency” standard requires courts to abandon an approach that 
limits tangible employment actions only to those acts that clearly manifest 
                                                          
 144. See Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 153 (3d Cir. 1999) (ruling that 
because the supervisor deprived the plaintiff of important business files, the conduct was 
properly characterized as a tangible employment action). 
 145. See id. at 152 (stressing that a supervisor must be authorized to take a specific 
action for that action to be considered a tangible employment action). 
 146. See id. at 153 (stating that direct economic harm is not essential to establishing a 
tangible employment action); see also Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 152 n.11 
(2004) (concluding that Ms. Suder’s supervisors’ actions regarding her computer skills 
exam could possibly be considered official conduct). 
 147. Cf. Chamallas, supra note 10, at 348-49 (pushing courts to develop an approach to 
employer liability that looks to the effects of supervisory conduct when defining tangible 
employment actions).  Chamallas’ argument examines the term tangible employment action 
in the context of constructive discharge prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Suders.  Id.  
In the post-Suders legal framework, however, Chamallas’ argument retains its analytic 
vitality and points the way toward defining tangible employment actions. 
 148. See McCann, supra note 13, at 782-83 (recognizing that the term tangible 
employment action is not limited exclusively to conduct that constitutes an economic loss). 
 149. Cf. Starkman, supra note 61, at 323 (“Although still amorphous, most ‘tangible 
employment actions’ will involve some kind of economic injury and may include future 
injuries, such as decreased opportunities for advancement.”). 
 150. See Durham Life, 166 F.3d at 153 (explaining the economic consequences that can 
arise out of official conduct, even though the conduct does not result in direct and 
immediate economic loss). 
 151. See Chamallas, supra note 10, at 341 (arguing that the question of liability is 
inextricably linked to the question of who actually caused the harm to the employee and that 
the presence of economic harm implicates the employer’s liability). 
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the agency relationship, such as firing or failing to promote, and adopt an 
approach that looks to the economic consequences that flow from a 
supervisor’s exercise of company authority regardless of whether the 
economic loss is direct.152 
2.  Lower court decisions reflecting this construction 
Several lower court decisions, including the Third Circuit’s decision in 
Durham Life Insurance Co. v. Evans, support this construction of the term 
tangible employment action.153  In Durham Life, Ms. Evans was a 
successful life insurance agent whose workplace conditions were altered as 
a result of her supervisors’ exercise of company authority.154  Ms. Evans’ 
problems culminated when management moved her out of a private office, 
denied her use of a secretary, and intentionally misplaced her essential 
business files.155  As a result, Ms. Evans was unable to successfully 
conduct her work and maintain her previous earning level.156  The court 
noted that Ms. Evans’ private office and her secretary were negotiated 
conditions of her employment.157  Additionally, and more importantly, the 
court held that the loss of Ms. Evans’ files constituted a tangible 
employment action because she was unable to work successfully without 
these files.158 
The court’s holding in Durham Life, which was based on the “aided by 
the agency” standard, recognized that direct economic harm is an 
important, but not essential, indicator of a tangible employment action.159  
                                                          
 152. Cf. id. (providing a framework for examining sexual harassment claims that does 
not constrain the analysis of employer liability to an exclusive and narrow category of overt 
acts resulting directly in economic harm to the plaintiff). 
 153. See Durham Life, 166 F.3d at 153-54 (holding that where a supervisor’s act 
decreases an employee’s earning potential and significantly disrupts the employee’s 
working conditions, a tangible employment action may be found even though the conduct 
did not constitute direct economic loss); see also An v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 
No. 01-2223, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 1509, at *13 (9th Cir. Feb. 2, 2004) (holding that a 
claim that a supervisor’s conduct created job insecurity is insufficient to constitute a 
tangible employment action); Glickstein v. Neshaminy Sch. Dist., No. 96-6236, 1999 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 727, at *36-37 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 1999) (concluding that a decision to reassign 
an employee to extra and less desirable work is sufficient to constitute a tangible 
employment action); cf. Booker v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., 17 F. Supp. 2d 735, 747 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1998) (holding that a demotion and a reassignment constituted a tangible employment 
action). 
 154. Durham Life, 166 F.3d at 145-46. 
 155. See id. at 153 (speculating that it could reasonably be inferred from the “suspicious” 
disappearance of Ms. Evans’ files that the supervisors had intentionally misplaced those 
files). 
 156. Id. at 153-54. 
 157. Id. at 153. 
 158. Id. 
 159. See id. (recognizing that “the concept of a tangible employment action is not limited 
to changes in compensation”); see also Lyon & Phillips, supra note 8, at 635 (highlighting 
that the Third Circuit’s decision in Durham Life suggests a definition of the term tangible 
employment action that includes conduct that substantially prevents the plaintiff’s ability to 
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The court reasoned that “[i]f an employer’s act substantially decreases an 
employee’s earning potential and causes significant disruption in his or her 
work conditions, a tangible adverse employment action may be found.”160  
The court in Durham Life found that the supervisors’ official conduct 
would lead to a decrease in Ms. Evans’ earning potential and would acutely 
disrupt her work conditions.161  Accordingly, the supervisors’ official 
actions could result in an economic loss and qualify as a tangible 
employment action.162  While misplaced files and an office move do not 
constitute direct economic loss, the supervisors’ conduct was reasonably 
certain to proximately cause consequential economic loss and thus 
qualified as a tangible employment action.163 
Other courts reflect this broader view of the “aided by the agency” 
standard.164  In the related field of race discrimination, a supervisor is 
“aided by the agency” when the supervisor acts within his or her official 
capacity.165  For example, in LaRoche v. Denny’s, Inc., the plaintiffs, all 
members of minority groups, were turned away from a Denny’s 
Restaurant.166  The manager at the Denny’s Restaurant refused to serve the 
plaintiffs, demanded that they leave, and locked the doors behind them.167  
The court reasoned that the “aided by the agency” standard is satisfied 
when a supervisor uses his or her authority as a manager to inflict harm.168  
Further, the court noted that the supervisor’s position empowered him to 
refuse to serve the plaintiffs and force them to leave.169  Accordingly, the 
court held that it was possible that the supervisor had been “aided by the 
                                                          
work effectively); Kagay, supra note 77, at 1052 (noting that in Durham Life, although the 
court labeled the plaintiff’s claim as a constructive discharge, the court essentially 
conducted an analysis of whether the supervisor’s conduct constituted a tangible 
employment action). 
 160. Durham Life, 166 F.3d at 153. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See id. (emphasizing the likely effect of the supervisors’ conduct on Ms. Evans’ 
future earning potential). 
 163. Id.; see McCann, supra note 13, at 783-84 (positing that the Third Circuit has 
effectively done away with the requirement of direct economic loss as the basis of a tangible 
employment action). 
 164. See LaRoche v. Denny’s, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 1999) 
(applying the “aided by the agency” standard to a claim of race discrimination).  LaRoche, a 
case which deals with race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, is used here as an 
example of the “aided by the agency” standard applied outside of Title VII sexual 
harassment.  Id. at 1373. 
 165. See id. at 1372-73 (explaining the application of the “aided by the agency” standard 
to cases of race discrimination). 
 166. Id. at 1368-69. 
 167. See id. (recounting that white customers were allowed to enter the restaurant after 
the plaintiffs had been told to leave). 
 168. See id. at 1374 (asserting that the supervisor exerted his managerial authority to 
force the plaintiffs to leave the restaurant). 
 169. Id. 
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agency” in accomplishing the tort.170 
3.  The Danger of A Narrow Construction of the term “Tangible 
Employment Action” 
Lower courts often mistakenly limit the term tangible employment action 
solely to official conduct that constitute direct economic loss.171  As these 
cases demonstrate, workplace reality is far more complex than a narrow 
category of such acts.172  These courts, relying on a narrow definition of the 
term tangible employment action, exclude conduct that falls outside of a 
narrow list of actions, even if the agency relationship aided the supervisor 
in accomplishing the sexual harassment.173  A narrow construction of this 
                                                          
 170. See id. (denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that 
the supervisor’s actions were aided by the agency relationship and thus implicated the 
employer in the supervisor’s commission of the tort of race discrimination). 
 171. See Dinkins v. Charoen Pokphand, USA, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1263 (M.D. 
Ala. 2001) (limiting the definition of tangible employment actions exclusively to ultimate 
employment decisions involving a significant change in benefits, privileges, opportunities, 
or employment status).  Dinkins mischaracterizes the term “tangible employment action” by 
restricting the definition exclusively to ultimate employment decisions constituting direct 
economic loss.  See also Gilbride & Erdheim, supra note 16, at 4 (predicting that lower 
courts after Suders will be left to define what conduct does and does not constitute an 
official act). 
 172. See Starkman, supra note 61, at 317-21 (postulating that there is no clear category 
to define actionable conduct in the workplace).  Lower court approaches to the question 
reveal that no clear line demarcates official and unofficial conduct.  Compare Barra v. Rose 
Tree Media Sch. Dist., 858 A.2d 206, 217 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004) (concluding that the 
plaintiff failed to establish a tangible employment action even though the plaintiff had been 
given a heavier workload than other employees and excluded from company meetings), with 
Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 152-53 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that a tangible 
employment action may exist where a supervisor’s actions significantly decrease an 
employee’s earning potential).  Much of the debate over the proper classification of the term 
“tangible employment action”, and the problem of whether or not a constructive discharge 
qualified as a tangible employment action, can be summarized as a distinction between a 
formalist approach and a realist approach.  Chamallas, supra note 10, at 347-48.  A realist 
approach, as opposed to a formalist approach, evaluates the presence of an official act based 
on whether the supervisor’s exercise of company authority resulted in consequential 
economic loss.  See id. (emphasizing the importance of evaluating the effects of a 
supervisor’s decision and not just the formal categories into which the decision falls).  This 
distinction is very important.  Id.  An emphasis on the supervisor’s decision-making process, 
rather than the decision’s formal classification, permits courts to move away from a strict 
reliance on formal categories to define supervisory conduct.  Id.  Courts relying on formal 
categories often fail to recognize what is, in reality, a tangible employment action.  Id.; see, 
e.g., Reinhold v. Virginia, 151 F.3d 172, 175 (4th Cir. 1998) (refusing to find a tangible 
employment action absent an overt invocation of company authority and direct economic 
loss). 
 173. See Gilbride & Erdheim, supra note 16, at 4 (recognizing that the term “official act” 
lacks a precise definition); see also McCann, supra note 13, at 782-83 (advocating a 
restrictive view of the term “tangible employment action” which limits the term exclusively 
to conduct that constitutes a direct economic loss).  Compare Glickstein v. Neshaminy Sch. 
Dist., No. 96-6236, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 727, at *37 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 1999) (concluding 
that a reasonable jury could find that being assigned extra and less desirable work 
constitutes a tangible employment action), with Reinhold, 151 F.3d at 175 (holding that 
merely being assigned extra work is not sufficient to constitute a tangible employment 
action). 
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term not only contradicts the “aided by the agency” standard as well as the 
Court’s holding in Suders, it also threatens to deprive plaintiffs of just 
compensation under Title VII.174 
For example, in Barra v. Rose Tree,175 the court, in holding that no 
tangible employment action occurred, refused to look to the economic 
consequences of the supervisor’s official conduct176 and did not 
acknowledge the official authority the supervisor exercised in making the 
decisions that altered Ms. Barra’s work environment.177  Ms. Barra was 
given a heavier workload than other employees without increased 
compensation, was not invited to meetings with vendors, was not given 
performance evaluations, and was deprived of her office keys without 
cause.178  While the supervisor had the exclusive authority to make each of 
these decisions, the court held that this conduct did not constitute a tangible 
employment action.179  The court’s narrow definition of this term 
overlooked the economic consequences that were reasonably certain to 
occur in the future as a proximate cause of the supervisor’s official 
conduct.180  Had the Barra court adopted the approach advocated in this 
Comment, the court likely would have held that the supervisor’s official 
conduct was reasonably certain to proximately cause economic loss and 
thus constituted a tangible employment action for which the employer 
                                                          
 174. See Gilbride & Erdheim, supra note 16, at 4 (speculating that the Supreme Court 
provided little guidance on the definition of the term “official act”).  Compare McCann, 
supra note 13, at 784 (postulating that plaintiffs may be able to prove the existence of a 
tangible employment action by showing non-economic actions the supervisor took to 
sexually harass the employee), with Chamallas, supra note 10, at 336-37 (stating that the 
classic definition of a tangible employment action is when economic harm flows from an 
official action). 
 175. 858 A.2d 206 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004). 
 176. See id. at 217 (concluding that the supervisor’s actions were not official conduct).  
The court, however, merely looked to whether the supervisor’s conduct constituted an 
economic loss, but failed to evaluate the future consequences of the supervisor’s conduct.  
Id.; see Starkman, supra note 61, at 323 (observing that future economic loss may be 
sufficient to render a supervisor’s conduct a tangible employment action). 
 177. Compare Barra, 858 A.2d at 217 (disregarding the supervisor’s exercise of 
authority in concluding that the supervisor’s conduct was not official), with Durham Life, 
166 F.3d at 153-54 (evaluating the presence of an official action based on whether the 
supervisors were authorized to make the decisions). 
 178. Barra, 858 A.2d at 209. 
 179. See id. at 217 (recognizing that Ms. Barra’s specific allegations of adverse 
employment actions were decisions within the ambit of her supervisor’s authority, but 
holding that the actions were not “official” under the Supreme Court’s decision in Suders). 
 180. Compare Booker v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., 17 F. Supp. 2d 735, 747 (M.D. Tenn. 
1998) (asserting that the plaintiff suffered a tangible employment action because the action, 
while not actually reducing the plaintiff’s salary, reduced his maximum salary grade and 
diminished his authority in the workplace), with Reinhold v. Virginia, 151 F.3d 172, 175 
(4th Cir. 1998) (concluding that under Ellerth and Faragher, the plaintiff was unable to 
prove that she suffered a tangible employment action), and Glickstein v. Neshaminy Sch. 
Dist., No. 96-6236, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 727, at *36 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 1999) (finding that 
the plaintiff suffered a tangible employment action because the supervisor exercised 
company authority in assigning her extra and less desirable work). 
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could be held automatically liable. 
C.  Consequential Economic Loss and the Court’s Decision in Suders 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Suders, which suggested that 
direct economic harm is not a prerequisite to a tangible employment action, 
supports a construction of this term that includes consequential economic 
loss.181  The Court recognized that a tangible employment action does not 
always inflict direct economic harm.182  Consistent with this observation, 
the Court stated that the supervisors’ conduct regarding Ms. Suders’ 
computer skills exam could potentially be considered a tangible 
employment action even though the conduct did not constitute direct 
economic loss.183 
Moreover, the Court’s unwillingness to hold that a constructive 
discharge is a per se tangible employment action does not prevent a broad 
interpretation of the term.184  Nor does the Court’s holding suggest that 
lower courts should adhere to a narrow category of supervisory conduct 
when determining the presence of an official act.185  Rather, Suders merely 
established a uniform framework with which to evaluate hostile work 
environment claims.186  The Court’s holding asserts that entirely unofficial 
                                                          
 181. See Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 152 n.11 (2004) (speculating that 
some of the supervisors’ conduct could possibly be considered official, thus constituting a 
tangible employment action). 
 182. See id. at 149-50 (providing a framework through which lower courts evaluate the 
presence or absence of a tangible employment action).  In an attempt to clarify the definition 
of a tangible employment action, the Supreme Court discussed two lower court cases, Reed 
v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., Inc., 333 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2003), and Robinson v. Sappington, 351 
F.3d 317 (7th Cir. 2003), that “indicate how the ‘official act’ (or ‘tangible employment 
action’) criterion should play out when constructive discharge is alleged.”  Id.; see also 
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761-62 (1998) (noting that a tangible 
employment action will, in most cases, but not always, involve direct economic harm). 
 183. Suders, 542 U.S. at 152 n.11. 
 184. See id. at 149 (asserting that because a hostile work environment claim and a hostile 
work environment constructive discharge claim differ only in the severity of the claim, they 
should not be treated differently merely because one of the claims results in the employee’s 
resignation).  But see Recent Cases, supra note 107, at 1008-10 (contending that viewing 
constructive discharge as not constituting a per se tangible employment action is a narrow 
interpretation of Ellerth and Faragher). 
 185. See Suders, 542 U.S. at 152 n.11 (highlighting the potentially official characteristics 
of some of the supervisors’ conduct). 
 186. See id. at 149 (underscoring that the Court’s holding merely ensures “categorical 
clarity” among the various sexual harassment claims).  The Court’s affirmation of 
“categorical clarity” for sexual harassment claims does not imply that a formalist 
understanding of the term “official act” guided the Court’s approach to the definition of 
tangible employment actions.  See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 801-
02 (1998) (dispensing with a “scope of employment” analysis of vicarious liability and 
affirming the “aided by the agency” standard in order to avoid confusing and unpredictable 
liability standards).  Similarly, the Supreme Court’s decision in Suders applies the “virtue of 
categorical clarity” to the analysis of the proper classification of constructive discharge 
claims.  Suders, 542 U.S. at 149 (noting the procedural difficulty that would ensue if the 
liability standard applied to hostile work environment constructive discharge claims differed 
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conduct does not constitute a tangible employment action, regardless of 
whether it results in a constructive discharge.187  Yet this holding does not 
imply that the Court intended to create a narrow category by which to 
classify official acts.188 
Rather than creating formal categories of official conduct, Suders can be 
read to support a definition of the term tangible employment action that 
includes both direct and consequential economic loss.189  In Suders, the 
Court, while recognizing that the supervisors’ verbal abuse and crude 
behavior was clearly unofficial, observed that the events surrounding the 
computer skills exam “were less obviously unofficial.”190  This suggests 
that these actions could be interpreted as a tangible employment action.191  
Ms. Suders was required, for example, to pass the computer skills exam.192  
Her failure to pass the exam, while not constituting direct economic loss, 
was reasonably certain to cause economic loss as a consequence of the 
supervisor’s conduct.193  Ms. Suders could be reassigned, she could be 
asked to complete computer training, or she could be asked to take time out 
from work to finish her computer training.194  As a result, Ms. Suders may 
have been denied promotion or prevented from lateral career 
advancement.195  Additionally, the supervisors’ accusation that Ms. Suders 
stole the exams and their act of arresting Ms. Suders was reasonably certain 
                                                          
from the liability standard applied to mere hostile work environment claims).  The Court 
pointed out that if all constructive discharges were considered tangible employment actions, 
it would actually be easier to prove a constructive discharge, which carries a heavier burden 
of proof, than to prove a simple hostile work environment claim, which carries a lighter 
burden of proof.  Id. 
 187. See Suders, 542 U.S. at 149-50 (emphasizing that an official act must underlie a 
constructive discharge for that discharge to be considered a tangible employment action).  
For example, the First Circuit’s decision in Reed reflects the view that because a 
constructive discharge will sometimes arise out of entirely unofficial conduct, there should 
not be a per se rule defining all constructive discharges as tangible employment actions.  
Reed, 333 F.3d at 33. 
 188. See Suders, 542 U.S. at 149-50 (articulating that the Court’s holding is an efficient 
approach toward establishing clarity and uniformity among Title VII liability standards). 
 189. See, e.g., Suders, 542 U.S. at 152  n.11 (suggesting that conduct that is not a direct 
economic loss could be considered a tangible employment action); Starkman, supra note 61, 
at 323 (recognizing the potentially broad scope of the term tangible employment action). 
 190. Suders, 542 U.S. at 152 n.11. 
 191. See id. (leaving open the possibility that the actions taken in response to the 
computer skills exams were official). 
 192. See id. at 136 (highlighting that the computer skills exam is a job requirement for 
officers of the Pennsylvania State Police and that the exams are sent to the Department of 
Officer Education to be evaluated). 
 193. See Starkman, supra note 61, at 323 (concluding that in light of the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Ellerth and Faragher, a tangible employment action will be based on a 
form of economic injury that could include “future injuries, such as decreased opportunities 
for advancement”). 
 194. Suders, 542 U.S. at 136. 
 195. See supra notes 129-138 and accompanying text (providing a framework for 
evaluating the presence of consequential economic loss). 
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to proximately cause economic loss.196  Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning suggests that the term tangible employment action is not limited 
exclusively to conduct that constitutes direct economic loss but also 
includes conduct that results in consequential economic loss.197 
D.  A Broad View of the Tangible Employment Action Framework 
Facilitates Title VII’s Objective of Deterrence and Remediation 
A broad definition of the term tangible employment action is consistent 
with Title VII’s policy objectives of deterring workplace discrimination 
and compensating individual victims of sexual harassment.198  A narrow 
definition of this term, in contrast, would not only contravene Title VII’s 
goal of deterrence but would also obstruct Title VII’s equally important 
remedial function.199  A broad definition of tangible employment actions 
benefits employers who identify and reprimand supervisors who use 
official power as an aid to sexually harass other employees and thus 
facilitates Title VII’s goal of deterrence.200  Moreover, this definition deters 
sexual harassment by providing employers and industries a market-
motivated incentive to prevent discrimination carried out through 
                                                          
 196. See Suders, 542 U.S. at 136 (describing the supervisors’ plan to arrest Ms. Suders). 
 197. See, e.g., Glickstein v. Neshaminy Sch. Dist., No. 96-6236, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
727, at *36-37 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 1999) (finding that the plaintiff suffered a tangible 
employment action because the supervisor’s conduct put the plaintiff in a position which 
would likely result in decreased earning potential); Dedner v. Oklahoma, 42 F. Supp. 2d 
1254, 1258 (E.D. Okla. 1999) (finding no tangible employment action where the supervisor 
merely refused to allow the plaintiff to take specified days off of work). 
 198. See Chamallas, supra note 10, at 381-83 (advocating an approach to Title VII that 
both deters harassment and compensates victims of sexual harassment). 
 199. See id. at 378-79 (discussing the various reasons why internal complaint procedures 
often fail to detect or deter sexual harassment).  “The irony of the current trend toward 
steering sexual harassment victims to use internal grievance procedures is that we may 
subtly be moving back to the approach of the 1970s when sexual harassment was considered 
to be a personal problem for individual women, rather than a systemic injury.”  Id. at 380.  
A strict view of the term “tangible employment action” is inconsistent with the actual 
experience of victims of sexual harassment.  Id.  But see Jackson v. Arkansas Dep’t of 
Educ., 272 F.3d 1020, 1025 (8th Cir. 2001) (noting that Title VII’s main objective is not to 
provide a remedy for harassment but to deter future harassment). 
 200. See Chamallas, supra note 10, at 382-83 (noting that more frequent compensation, 
which offers an incentive for employer’s to reduce harassment, furthers the objective of 
deterrence).  This broad definition does not contravene the requirement of notice to the 
employer.  See Jones v. U.S.A. Petroleum Corp., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1379, 1385 (S.D. Ga. 1998) 
(underscoring that notice is the “keystone” for imposing liability for a supervisor’s sexual 
harassment).  The notice requirement is intended to ensure not only that the employer is 
aware of the harassment, but also that the employer can take steps to deter the harassment.  
Id. at 1384-85.  An employer has notice of conduct resulting in consequential economic loss 
in the same way the employer has notice of conduct constituting direct economic loss.  In 
both instances, the supervisor has taken an official act of the company for which the 
employer is presumed to be aware.  Cf. Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 153-
54 (3d Cir. 1999) (deeming as official the supervisors’ conduct which resulted in 
consequential economic loss). 
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supervisors’ use of official power.201  Lastly, because official acts involve 
company authority, the employer is presumptively on notice.202  
A broad definition of this term also facilitates Title VII’s remedial 
objectives.203  If tangible employment actions are limited exclusively to 
official conduct manifesting as a direct economic loss, employees harassed 
by means of conduct which does not result in direct economic loss will 
most likely be unable to survive summary judgment, thus discouraging 
victims to come forward and complain about abuses of official power.204  
Such a limitation would undermine Title VII’s remedial objective.205  Many 
victims do not report sexual harassment out of a fear of reprisal, ridicule, or 
damage to their careers.206  The overwhelming evidence suggests that 
victims are unlikely to report the harassment, even if a company has an 
internal reporting procedure.207  A narrow definition of a tangible 
employment action would further discourage victims from reporting 
                                                          
 201. See Chamallas, supra note 10, at 382 (noting that legal liability itself creates an 
incentive to deter workplace discrimination); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 
803-04 (1998) (reconciling the Supreme Court’s decision in Meritor with traditional agency 
principles under a risk-allocation model of employer liability and concluding that the 
appropriate standard is one of vicarious liability for supervisor sexual harassment with the 
availability of an affirmative defense when the supervisory conduct does not culminate in a 
tangible employment action). 
 202. See Chamallas, supra note 10, at 382 (emphasizing the importance of combining 
both deterrence and remediation in constructing standards for employer liability). 
 203. See Grossman, supra note 1, at 27 (articulating that rules for employer liability 
under Title VII should contribute to Title VII’s goal of deterrence and remediation). 
 204. See Marks, supra note 11, at 1429-31 (pointing out that the affirmative defense 
framework has established a rule of contributory negligence under which any failure on the 
plaintiff’s part to report the sexual harassment becomes a complete bar to liability). 
 205. See Chamallas, supra note 10, at 379-80 (describing the hesitancy of women to 
report sexual harassment in the workplace and the deficiency of most internal complaint 
procedures, thus leading to Title VII’s inability to “dismantle entrenched gender hierarchies 
in the workplace”); see also Beiner, supra note 113, at 307-08 (discussing empirical 
evidence indicating that placing the burden on women to report sexual harassment is 
inconsistent with workplace responses to sexual harassment). 
In some cases, adopting these coping strategies may be wiser than reporting a 
single incident of harassment.  They may allow women to minimize the impact of 
harassment by seeming to ignore it or taking steps to avoid harassers.  Studies show 
that job loss and demotion are potential outcomes for sexually harassed employees.  
If some form of retaliation is possible, the choice not to report the harassment is 
rational. 
Id. at 312-13; see Kerri Lynn Bauchner, From Pig in a Parlor to Boar in a Boardroom:  
Why Ellerth Isn’t Working and How Other Ideological Models Can Help Reconceptualize 
the Law of Sexual Harassment, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 303, 315-16 (1999) (contending 
that the reporting requirement thwarts Title VII’s remedial objective by preventing many 
victims of sexual harassment from receiving any compensation for their injuries). 
 206. See Beiner, supra note 113, at 313 (discussing some of the common reasons victims 
do not report harassment). 
 207. See Chamallas, supra note 10, at 373-74 (critiquing the second prong of the 
affirmative defense that requires employees to report harassment).  Chamallas points out 
that the second prong of the affirmative defense, which envisions a reasonable individual, is 
flawed.  Id.  Due to the reasonable person standard under the second prong, the analysis 
hinges on the question of why the person did not report the sexual harassment.  Id.  The 
consequence of this is to provide a complete defense against liability.  Id. at 373. 
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harassment.208  Accordingly, to facilitate Title VII’s purpose of remedying 
sexual harassment and deterring future harassment, the category of conduct 
that qualifies as a tangible employment action should be construed broadly. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the doctrinal clarity Suders provides for sexual harassment 
claims, defining the term tangible employment action remains a 
contentious issue.  The affirmative defense framework established in 
Ellerth and Faragher currently gives employers sufficient protection 
against liability for sexual harassment.  Given employers’ broad protection 
under the affirmative defense framework, a narrow definition of the term 
tangible employment action would render meaningless the agency 
principles the Court designed to govern liability for supervisory-based 
sexual harassment.  To prevent the development of case law that narrows 
Suders’ discussion of the official act requirement, this Comment proposes a 
definition of the term tangible employment action that includes not only 
conduct constituting direct economic loss but also a supervisor’s conduct 
resulting in consequential economic loss.  While the second category is 
potentially controversial, it is an important component of the framework of 
employer liability established in Ellerth and Faragher and reaffirmed in 
Suders.  The second category is consistent with the “aided by the agency” 
standard and facilitates Title VII’s deterrent function by providing an 
incentive for the employer to deter sexual harassment and enforce 
appropriate workplace behavior.  Most importantly, in an effort to deter 
future instances of sexual harassment, many courts have forgotten the 
actual victims of sexual harassment.  This Comment advocates an approach 
to employer liability that returns some of the focus to those victims. 
 
                                                          
 208. See Lawton, supra note 113, at 209-10 (arguing that the affirmative defense to 
vicarious liability in Ellerth and Faragher fails to deter sexual harassment). 
